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PRIOR STATEMENTS OF TESTIFYING
WITNESSES: DRAFTING CHOICES
TO ELIMINATE OR LOOSEN THE STRICTURES
OF THE HEARSAY RULE
Daniel J. Capra*
One of the panels at the Symposium on Hearsay Reform—sponsored by
the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules—
considered whether the federal hearsay regime should be changed to
provide for greater admissibility of prior statements of testifying witnesses.
This Article is intended to provide some background to the questions
addressed by the panel and to consider how the Advisory Committee on
Federal Rules of Evidence (“the Advisory Committee” or “the Committee”)
might best implement an expansion of admissibility of prior witness
statements should it decide that such an expansion is warranted.
Before deciding on an amendment, the Committee will need to work
through several important substantive decisions. Among those decisions
are:
(1) Should prior statements of testifying witnesses be placed outside
the hearsay definition—or should an exception be established—
given the fact that the declarant is subject to cross-examination
about the statement?
(2) Assuming that prior witness statements remain subject to the
hearsay rule, should the current exemption in Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
be expanded to allow for substantive admissibility of all (or
more, if not all) prior inconsistent statements? Currently,
substantive admissibility is extremely limited, applying only to
those statements that were made under oath at a formal
proceeding.1
(3) Assuming that prior statements of testifying witnesses remain
subject to the hearsay rule, is there any reason to expand the
exemption for prior consistent statements—Rule 801(d)(1)(B)—
given the recent expansion that became effective in 2014? The
2014 amendment provides that if a prior consistent statement is

* Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules; Reed Professor of Law, Fordham
University School of Law.
1. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
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properly admitted under Rule 4032 to rehabilitate a witness
whose credibility has been attacked,3 it is also admissible as
substantive evidence—i.e., as proof that the content in the
statement is true.4
(4) Assuming that prior statements of testifying witnesses remain
subject to the hearsay rule, is there any reason to alter the
existing exemption in Rule 801(d)(1)(C) for statements of
identification?5
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I discusses the arguments for
and against classifying prior statements of testifying witnesses as hearsay.
Part II discusses the history behind the Federal Rules’ treatment of prior
inconsistent statements, as well as the different approaches taken in some of
the states. Part III provides the history of the Federal Rules’ treatment of
prior consistent statements, including the 2014 amendment, and discusses
the possibility of further expansion of admissibility of such statements. Part
IV briefly discusses prior statements of identification and considers whether
any changes to the existing exemption would be useful. Part V provides
preliminary drafting alternatives.
I. SHOULD PRIOR STATEMENTS OF TESTIFYING WITNESSES
BE TREATED AS HEARSAY?
This part considers whether, as a matter of hearsay theory and
understandable trial practice, it makes sense to treat prior statements of
testifying witnesses as hearsay. If the problem of hearsay is solved by
cross-examination, why should the hearsay rule apply when the statement is
made by a witness who can be cross-examined?
A. Arguments in Favor of Admitting Prior Statements
of Witnesses As Substantive Evidence
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement that “the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing.”6
Thus, a prior statement of a testifying witness, when offered for its truth, is
hearsay. So when the witness says, “I told my cousin that I saw the
defendant texting while driving and then he ran over the plaintiff,” that is
not admissible to prove the facts asserted in the statement to the cousin.7
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that evidence may be admitted unless its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, or
delay. Id. 403.
3. See id. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note to the 2014 amendment (noting that
“to be admissible for rehabilitation, a prior consistent statement must satisfy the strictures of
Rule 403”).
4. Id. 801(d)(1)(B).
5. Rule 801(d)(1)(C) provides that a declarant’s statement of identification is
substantively admissible if the declarant testifies at trial subject to cross-examination. Id.
801(d)(1)(C).
6. Id. 801(c)(1).
7. Of course, the witness could also testify to what he saw at the time of the accident,
and that would not be hearsay. Under the Federal Rule, though, the witness’s statement
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Many scholars have argued that prior statements of testifying witnesses
should not be classified as hearsay. The leading proponent for placing prior
statements of testifying witnesses outside the hearsay rule was probably
Professor Edmund Morgan.8 Morgan’s basic argument is that the rule
against hearsay stems from a concern that the out-of-court declarant’s
credibility cannot be assessed by the traditional methods of oath, crossexamination, and view of demeanor.9 But when the declarant is the witness
at trial, she will be under oath and subject to cross-examination and review
of demeanor. Morgan makes this point in his famous article, Hearsay
Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept:
When the Declarant is also a witness, it is difficult to justify classifying as
hearsay evidence of his own prior statements. . . . The courts declare the
prior statement to be hearsay because it was not made under oath, subject
to the penalty for perjury or to the test of cross-examination. To which
the answer might well be: “The declarant as a witness is now under oath
and now purports to remember and narrate accurately. The adversary can
now expose every element that may carry a danger of misleading the trier
of fact both in the previous statement and in the present testimony, and
the trier can judge whether both the previous declaration and the present
testimony are reliable in whole or in part.”10

Morgan realizes, of course, that at the time the witness made the prior
statement she was not subjected to cross-examination, oath, or a review of
demeanor. But he argues that the existence of these protections at the time
of trial should suffice. Morgan observes that if the prior statement is
consistent with the in-court testimony, it is being affirmed by the witness
“under oath subject to all sanctions and to cross-examination in the
presence of the trier who is to value it.”11 As Morgan notes, a prior
consistent statement might be excluded on the grounds that it is cumulative,
“but surely the rejection should not be on the ground that the statement
involves any danger inherent in hearsay.”12
about the prior event is treated no differently than any other declarant’s statement about the
event. If it is offered for truth, it is hearsay.
One might ask why a party would want to admit a witness’s prior statement about an
event when the witness can simply testify about the event itself. The answer is that in many
cases the in-court testimony of the event has a different evidentiary significance than the
statement made earlier and closer in time to the event. Moreover, if the witness has now
changed his story about the event, the prior (inconsistent) statement obviously has a different
effect than the in-court testimony.
8. Morgan drafted the Model Code of Evidence in 1942. THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 389 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). The Model Code
contained a definition of hearsay that covered prior statements of testifying witnesses, but
further provided that hearsay was admissible whenever the declarant either was “unavailable
as a witness” or was “present and subject to cross-examination.” MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
r. 801(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1942). But the provision was not well received at the time. See
David Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15–17.
9. See generally Edmund Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
10. Id. at 192–94.
11. Id. at 196.
12. Id.

1432

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

But what if the witness denies having made any statement at all? That
should not be a problem according to Morgan because the witness “will
usually swear that he tried to tell the truth in anything that he may have
said.”13 Thus, cross-examination on that averment will be sufficient to
regulate any credibility questions as of the time the statement was made. If,
on the other hand, the witness concedes that he made the statement but now
swears that it was not true, the jury, viewing the testimony of the person
who made both statements, is in a good position to assess which story
represents the truth in light of all the facts. Morgan concludes:
In any of these situations Proponent is not asking Trier to rely upon the
credibility of anyone who is not present and subject to all the conditions
imposed upon a witness. Adversary has all the protection which oath and
cross-examination can give him. Trier is in a position to consider the
evidence impartially and to give it no more than its reasonable persuasive
effect. Consequently there is no real reason for classifying the evidence
as hearsay.14

Two further points can be made in support of exempting prior statements
of witnesses from the hearsay rule. First, the prior statement is by
definition closer in time to the event described and so is less likely to be
impaired by faulty memory or a litigation motive.15 Second, treating all
prior statements of testifying witnesses as outside the hearsay rule would
dispense with the need to give confusing limiting instructions as to those
statements that would be admissible anyway for credibility purposes—for
example, an instruction that “the prior inconsistent statement may not be
considered as a proof of any fact, but only for its bearing on the credibility
of the witness.”16 Indeed the interest in avoiding difficult-to-follow
instructions was the animating reason behind the 2014 amendment to Rule
801(d)(1)(B) that eliminated the distinction between substantive and
rehabilitative uses for prior consistent statements.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearing on H.R. 5463 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 65 (1974) (statement of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and
Procedure and the Advisory Comm. on Rules of Evidence of the Judicial Conf. of the U. S.)
(“The prior statement was made nearer in time to the events, when memory was fresher and
intervening influences had not been brought into play.”).
16. See Morgan, supra note 9, at 193 (“Furthermore, it must be remembered that the
trier of fact is often permitted to hear these prior statements to impeach or rehabilitate the
declarant-witness. In such event, of course, the trier will be told that he must not treat the
statement as evidence of the truth of the matter stated. But to what practical effect? . . . Do
the judges deceive themselves or do they realize that they are indulging in a pious fraud?”);
see also Steven DeBraccio, That’s (Not) What She Said: The Case for Expanding Admission
of Prior Inconsistent Statements in New York Criminal Trials, 78 ALB. L. REV. 269, 297
(2014) (“[I]t would be more beneficial to our trial process to simply allow the jurors to
consider the evidence as truth and avoid the never-ending discussion on the usefulness of
limiting instructions.”).
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B. Arguments in Favor of Treating Prior Statements
of Witnesses As Hearsay
The classic argument for treating prior statements of witnesses as hearsay
was set forth by Justice Royal A. Stone of the Minnesota Supreme Court in
State v. Saporen.17 He contended that delayed cross-examination of a
statement at trial is simply not the same as cross-examination at the time the
statement is made:
The chief merit of cross examination is not that at some future time it
gives the party opponent the right to dissect adverse testimony. Its
principal virtue is in its immediate application of the testing process. Its
strokes fall while the iron is hot. False testimony is apt to harden and
become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the witness has
opportunity for reconsideration and influence by the suggestions of
others, whose interest may be, and often is, to maintain falsehood rather
than truth.18

The Saporen court’s view of cross-examination at trial as “[striking]
while the iron is hot” is surely overstated.19 It is not as if an adversary’s
witness is speaking extemporaneously and off-the-cuff during direct
testimony. Trial testimony is usually prepared in advance and elicited in a
formal question-and-answer format. For the cross-examiner of a witness at
trial, the iron is not truly hot. Put another way, the asserted gap in
effectiveness between cross-examination about a prior statement and crossexamination of trial testimony is surely not as wide as the Saporen court
suggests.
That said, there is certainly dispute in the profession about the
comparative effectiveness of delayed cross-examination and crossexamination of trial testimony. At the symposium, Professor Saltzburg
made a strong argument that delayed cross-examination is particularly
ineffective when the witness denies ever having made a statement. It must
be said, however, that the implausibility of such a denial in many
circumstances—such as when the prior statement was recorded—should cut
in favor of admissibility of the prior statement because in such cases the
witness can be cross-examined about that discrepancy. Moreover, a witness
should not be allowed to bar admissibility of his prior statement simply by
declaring falsely that he never made it. Finally, a witness who denies he
made a statement is really no different from a witness to an event who
testifies and denies seeing the event—and yet such a witness’s statement
about the event is routinely admitted subject to cross-examination.
Besides the alleged infirmity of delayed cross-examination, there are two
other arguments that have been put forth in favor of treating prior
statements of witnesses as hearsay. The first is illustrated by United States
v. Check,20 a case decided in the early days of the Federal Rules, in which
17.
18.
19.
20.

285 N.W. 898 (Minn. 1939).
Id. at 901.
Id.
582 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1978).
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the prosecution and the trial judge were apparently under the misimpression
that prior statements of testifying witnesses were not hearsay. A
government agent testified to a conversation he had with Check’s
accomplice. The testimony was carefully crafted to refer only to what the
agent had said and not to what the accomplice had said—because that
would be hearsay. Here is an example of the agent’s trial testimony:
I told William Cali at the time I didn’t particularly care whether or not the
cocaine which I was supposed to get was 70 percent pure, nor the fact that
it was supposed to come from a captain of detectives[, i.e., Check].21

The government took the position that the agent’s testimony was not
hearsay because it referred only to his own prior statements. So it can be
argued that if the rule actually were that prior statements of witnesses are
not hearsay, cases like Check would arise and parties would offer one side
of a conversation pretextually to prove the other side—that is, not treating
prior statements of witnesses as hearsay would result in those statements
serving as conduits and would lead to abuse of the hearsay rule.
Check demonstrates, however, that this concern is overwrought. The
Second Circuit reversed the conviction for two reasons. First, the trial court
and the prosecution were wrong to believe that the agent’s own statements
could not be hearsay just because the agent was testifying. But even if they
were right, the agent’s statements should not have been admitted because
“notwithstanding the artful phrasing . . . [the agent] was on numerous
occasions throughout his testimony in essence conveying to the jury the
precise substance of the out-of-court statements Cali made to him.”22 The
court concluded that “in substance, significant portions of Spinelli’s
testimony regarding his conversations with Cali were indeed hearsay, for
that testimony was a transparent attempt to incorporate into the officer’s
testimony information supplied by the informant who did not testify at
trial.”23 In other words, even if the hearsay rule is changed to allow
admission of prior statements of witnesses for their truth, those statements
would still be excluded if they were being used to carry in hearsay
statements of other declarants.24
The other argument in favor of excluding prior witness statements as
hearsay focuses on prior consistent statements. If all prior statements could
be admitted for their truth, there would be an incentive for parties to have
their witnesses generate consistent statements before trial. Then the witness
could be asked on direct examination about all the previous statements that
he made—to his grandmother, to the church congregation, to the bus driver
21. Id. at 671.
22. Id. at 675.
23. Id. at 679.
24. See United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 22 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that the
government violated the hearsay rule even though it did not seek to introduce the hearsay
statements directly; because the statements were effectively before the jury in the context of
the trial, “any other conclusion would permit the government to evade the limitations of the
Sixth Amendment and the Rules of Evidence by weaving an unavailable declarant’s
statements into another witness’s testimony by implication”).
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on the way to testify, et cetera. The focus would then be shifted,
problematically, to the prior statements as opposed to the in-court
testimony.25
There are several counterarguments responding to the concern about
manufactured consistent statements. First, you do not need an overbroad
hearsay rule to regulate that problem because litigation-generated extrinsic
statements can be excluded under Rule 403 as cumulative and unduly
prejudicial.26 Second, the witness can be cross-examined about the context
and generation of the consistent statements.27 Third, this concern about
overuse of consistent statements, even if valid, should not lead to a rule that
all prior statements are hearsay; there is no risk of witnesses manufacturing
inconsistent statements, for example, and so the concern about generating
evidence is localized and should be addressed to prior consistent statements
only.
There is a fourth argument against admitting prior witness statements in
criminal cases that can be dismissed: admitting a prior statement of a
witness against a criminal defendant violates his right to confrontation. The
Supreme Court has rejected that argument in at least three cases, finding
that an opportunity to cross-examine the witness about his prior statement
satisfies the Confrontation Clause.28
In sum, there is much to be said for a rule that exempts prior witness
statements from the hearsay rule. At the very least, there is a strong case
for broader admissibility of prior inconsistent statements. It is notable that
such a broader approach has been taken in a number of states. A few
jurisdictions admit all prior statements of witnesses for their truth. For
example, Kansas states its hearsay rule and then provides an exception for
all prior statements of testifying witnesses:
60-460. Hearsay evidence excluded; exceptions. Evidence of a statement
which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing,
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, is hearsay evidence and
inadmissible except:
a. Previous statements of persons present. A statement previously
made by a person who is present at the hearing and available for
25. See State v. Saporen, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (Minn. 1939) (noting that the “practical
reason” for treating prior witness statements as hearsay is that it would create temptation and
opportunity to manufacture evidence).
26. The corresponding response to the Rule 403 argument is that the rule is highly
discretionary and only operates to exclude evidence where its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the risk of prejudice, confusion, and delay.
27. The response here is, once again, that cross-examination must strike while the iron is
hot.
28. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“Finally, we reiterate that,
when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. . . . The Clause does not bar
admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.”);
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (finding no confrontation violation where
witness was subject to cross-examination about his prior statement of identification, even
though he had no memory about why he made the identification); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970) (rejecting confrontation claim where the defendant had an opportunity to
cross-examine a prosecution witness about the witness’s prior statement).
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cross-examination with respect to the statement and its subject
matter, provided the statement would be admissible if made by
declarant while testifying as a witness.29

Similarly, Puerto Rico provides in a hearsay exception for substantive
admissibility for all prior statements of testifying witnesses:
Rule 63. Prior statement by witness. As an exception to the hearsay rule,
a prior statement made by a witness who appears at a trial or hearing and
who is subject to cross-examination as to the prior statement is
admissible, provided that such statement is admissible if made by the
declarant appearing as witness.30

Similarly, the Delaware Code provides that any voluntary prior statement
of a testifying witness “may be used as affirmative evidence with
substantive independent testimonial value” and the party need not show
surprise.31
There is nothing to indicate that the sky has fallen or that advocacy has
been impaired as a result of more liberal admissibility in these jurisdictions.
II. PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
This part evaluates the tortured history of the current Federal Rule on
prior inconsistent statements under the hearsay rule. We will see that while
the Advisory Committee’s proposal was a correct application of hearsay
theory, Congress had the last word.
A. How Did We Get Here?:
The History of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
The common law approach to prior inconsistent statements was that they
were hearsay and were admissible only to impeach the declarant-witness.
The original Advisory Committee thought that the common law rule,
distinguishing between impeachment and substantive use of prior
inconsistent statements, was “troublesome.”32 It noted that the major
concern of the hearsay rule is that an out-of-court statement could not be
tested for reliability because the person who made the statement could not
be cross-examined about it. But with prior inconsistent statements, “[t]he
declarant is in court and may be examined and cross-examined in regard to
his statements and their subject matter.”33 And the Committee thought that
it had never been “satisfactorily explained why cross-examination [could
not] be conducted subsequently with success.”34 Moreover, “The trier of
fact has the declarant before it and can observe his demeanor and the nature
of his testimony as he denies or tries to explain away the inconsistency.”35
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (2015).
P.R. LANS. ANN. tit. 32, Ap. N (2015).
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 3507 (2015).
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) advisory committee’s note.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, “the inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than the
testimony of the witness at the trial because it was made nearer in time to
the matter to which it relates and is less likely to be influenced by the
controversy that gave rise to the litigation.”36
For all these reasons, the Advisory Committee’s proposed Rule
801(d)(1)(A) would have exempted all prior inconsistent statements of
testifying witnesses from the hearsay rule. The Advisory Committee’s note
to the proposal makes this clear: “Prior inconsistent statements traditionally
have been admissible to impeach but not as substantive evidence. Under
the rule they are substantive evidence.”37
Congress, however, cut back significantly on the Advisory Committee
proposal. In the form ultimately adopted, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) states that only
those prior inconsistent statements “given under penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition” are admissible as
substantive evidence.38 The rationales for this limitation, as expressed by
the House Committee on the Judiciary, are that: 1) if the statement was
given under oath at a formal proceeding, “there can be no dispute as to
whether the prior statement was made”; and 2) the requirements of oath and
formality of proceeding “provide firm additional assurances of the
reliability of the prior statement.”39
There are problems with the rationales for Congress’s tightening of the
hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements. The first congressional
concern—that the statement may never have been made—is not a hearsay
concern. Whether the statement was made (as distinguished from whether
it is true) is a question ordinarily addressed by in-court regulators—the incourt witness to the statement testifies and is cross-examined, or other
admissible evidence is presented that the statement was or was not made;
this becomes a jury question.40 Really, Congress’s argument proves too
much, because admitting any out-of-court statement raises the question of
whether it was ever made. Why do we find the in-court witness’s testimony
that the statement was made in all other situations sufficient, but question
the in-court testimony with respect to prior inconsistent statements?41
Second, the requirements of oath and formality surely do add reliable
circumstances, and thus these requirements do respond to a hearsay
concern. But the fact is that the witness is now under oath at trial, subject
to cross-examination. That should be a sufficient guarantee of reliability,
and adding the oath and formality requirements raise the admissibility
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. 801(d)(1)(A).
39. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 13 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7087.
40. Of course, the inconsistent statement could be proven up through hearsay subject to
an exception, such as a business record, FED R. EVID. 803(6), or public record, id. 803(8).
The point is that concerns about whether the statement was ever made are not a reason,
under the hearsay rule, to exclude the statement itself.
41. Even if the concern about manufactured prior statements were legitimate, it would
not need to be regulated by the requirements of oath at a formal proceeding. A less onerous
requirement, such as that the statement was recorded, should surely suffice.
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hurdle for prior inconsistent statements much higher than for most of the
other hearsay exceptions.
The end result of this congressional intervention is to render the hearsay
exception for prior inconsistent statements relatively useless. It goes
without saying that the vast majority of prior inconsistent statements are not
made under oath at a formal proceeding. Essentially, the only function for
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is to protect the proponent (usually the government)
from having its substantive case sapped by turncoat witnesses. Congress’s
rationales for adding the oath and formality requirements are simply not
strong enough to justify gutting the exception proposed by the Advisory
Committee. This is especially so because the limitation comes with
significant negative consequences, including the following:
(1) Excluding testimony as hearsay even though the declarant can be
cross-examined;
(2) Requiring a difficult-to-follow jury instruction, specifically, that
the statement can be used only to impeach the witness but not for
its truth—even though in many cases its impeachment value is
dependent on it being true;
(3) Raising the possibility that parties will seek to evade the rule by
calling witnesses to “impeach” them with prior inconsistent
statements with the hope that the jury will use the statements as
proof of the matter asserted. That will require the courts to
investigate and determine the motivation of the proponent for
calling the witness (motivation that would be irrelevant if the
prior statement were substantively admissible);42 and
(4) Raising the possibility that prior inconsistent statements not
admissible for truth under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) will still be found
admissible for truth under the residual exception (Rule 807)
anyway. Federal Rule 807 provides that a hearsay statement not
admissible under any other exception might nonetheless be
admitted if it is trustworthy and if other stated admissibility
requirements are met.43 As applied to Rule 801(d)(1)(A), a
proponent might argue that a prior inconsistent statement is
admissible for its truth because it is reliable, even if it was not
made under oath at a formal proceeding—and the reliability
42. See, e.g., United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d 576, 578 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding
government’s impeachment of its witness with a prior inconsistent statement was improper
where “the only apparent purpose” for the impeachment “was to circumvent the hearsay rule
and to expose the jury to otherwise inadmissible evidence”); cf. United States v. Kane, 944
F.2d 1406, 1412 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement was
improper where the prosecution had no reason to think that the witness would be hostile or
would create the need to impeach her); see also People v. Fitzpatrick, 40 N.Y.2d 44, 49, 50
n.1 (1976) (noting the concern that “the prosecution might misuse impeachment techniques
to get before a jury material which could not otherwise be put in evidence because of its
extrajudicial nature”; also noting that “a number of authorities have pointed out that the
potential for prejudice in the out-of-court statements may be exaggerated in cases where the
person making the statement is in court and available for cross-examination”).
43. FED. R. EVID. 807.
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would be, ironically, that the declarant was subject to crossexamination about the prior statement.44
B. State Variations
In deciding whether to expand the admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements, there are many reference points provided in the state rules of
evidence. It is particularly notable that a large number of states have
rejected the congressional limitation on substantive admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements—the state deviation is far greater than that with
respect to most of the other Federal Rules of Evidence.
1. Rejection of Congressional Limitation in Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
Many of the states did not adopt the congressional limitation on
substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements. In the following
states, prior inconsistent statements are admissible for their truth:
Alaska45
Arizona46
California47
Colorado48
Delaware49
Georgia50
Montana51
Nevada52
Rhode Island53
South Carolina54
Wisconsin55

44. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez-Soto, 31 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
a prior inconsistent statement not under oath to be properly admitted as substantive evidence
under the residual exception and noting that “the degree of reliability necessary for
admission is greatly reduced where, as here, the declarant is testifying and is available for
cross-examination, thereby satisfying the central concern of the hearsay rule” (quoting
United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1350–51 (7th Cir. 1979))).
45. ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
46. ARIZ. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(a).
47. CAL. EV. CODE § 1235.
48. COLO. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
49. DEL. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
50. GA. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
51. MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
52. 4 NEV. STAT. § 51.035(2)(A).
53. R.I. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
54. S.C. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
55. WIS. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
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2. Variations Short of Outright Rejection
of the Congressional Limitation
Other states provide less onerous alternatives to the congressional
restriction on substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements. For
example, Arkansas requires prior oath at a formal proceeding for civil cases
only.56 Connecticut addresses the concern about whether the statement was
ever made with a narrower limitation. The exception covers
[a] prior inconsistent statement of a witness, provided (A) the statement is
in writing or otherwise recorded by audiotape, videotape, or some other
equally reliable medium, (B) the writing or recording is duly
authenticated as that of the witness, and (C) the witness has personal
knowledge of the contents of the statement.57

Requirements (B) and (C) are surplusage because they are covered by
other rules (authentication by Rule 901 and personal knowledge by Rule
602). But the Connecticut version does suggest a compromise approach
that might be employed—which would expand the exception so long as
there is assurance that the prior inconsistent statement was actually made.
Again, whether it was made is not a hearsay problem, but a provision
requiring that the statement be recorded, signed, et cetera would satisfy
those whose concern is about witnesses (such as police officers) cooking up
prior inconsistent statements of other witnesses.
Hawaii similarly expands the exception beyond the congressional
limitation, while still addressing concerns that the statement was never
made. Besides statements under oath at a prior proceeding, Hawaii
provides substantive admissibility for prior inconsistent statements when
they are “reduced to writing and signed or otherwise adopted or approved
by the declarant” and also when they are “recorded in substantially
verbatim fashion by stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other means
contemporaneously with the making of the statement.”58
Illinois, similar to Connecticut, addresses the concern that the statement
was never made. Prior inconsistent statements are admissible substantively
if properly recorded, but Illinois also includes as a ground for admissibility
that “the declarant acknowledged under oath the making of the statement
either in the declarant’s testimony at the hearing or trial in which the
admission into evidence of the prior statement is being sought or at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition.”59 Illinois thus adds an
interesting addition—the statement does not need to be recorded if the
declarant acknowledges making the statement while testifying at trial. That
is a completely justifiable proposition because there should be no doubt
about the prior statement if the declarant actually acknowledges making it.

56.
57.
58.
59.

ARK. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i).
CONN. CODE EVID. R. 8-5.
HAWAII R. EVID. 802.1(1)(B)–(C).
ILL. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
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Louisiana does not permit substantive use of prior inconsistent statements
in a civil cases.60 Prior inconsistent statements are admissible substantively
in a criminal case, “provided that the proponent has first fairly directed the
witness’[s] attention to the statement and the witness has been given the
opportunity to admit the fact and where there exists any additional evidence
to corroborate the matter asserted by the prior inconsistent statement.”61
Maryland has a provision similar to Connecticut, allowing substantive
use of a prior inconsistent statement if there is assurance that it was actually
made. Such statements are admissible if they have been “reduced to writing
and . . . signed by the declarant” or “recorded in substantially verbatim
fashion by stenographic or electronic means contemporaneously with the
making of the statement.”62
New Jersey provides for substantive admissibility of all prior inconsistent
statements of a witness called by an opposing party. However, if the
witness is called by the proponent, safeguards must be met. The proponent
must show that the statement “(A) is contained in a sound recording or in a
writing made or signed by the witness in circumstances establishing its
reliability or (B) was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial or other judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, administrative or grand jury
proceeding, or in a deposition.”63 Assuming there are risks of reliability
and questions about whether the statement was ever made, it is unclear why
those risks are only raised when the proponent calls the witness.
North Dakota applies the congressional limitation in Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
in criminal cases only.64
Pennsylvania, like Connecticut, expands beyond the congressional
limitation but requires a showing that the prior inconsistent statement was
actually made:
(1) Prior Inconsistent Statement of Declarant-Witness. A prior statement
by a declarant-witness that is inconsistent with the declarant-witness’s
testimony and:
(A) was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition;
(B) is a writing signed and adopted by the declarant; or
(C) is a verbatim contemporaneous electronic, audiotaped, or
videotaped recording of an oral statement.65

Utah rejects the congressional limitation and also treats prior statements
as not hearsay when the witness denies or has forgotten the statement. So
there appears to be no concern at all in Utah about whether the prior
inconsistent statement was ever made:
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay.
following conditions is not hearsay:
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

LA. CODE EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
Id.
MD. R. EVID. 5-802.1.
N.J. R. EVID. 803(a)(1).
N.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
PA. R. EVID. 803.1.

A statement that meets the
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(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant testifies
and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and
the statement:
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony or the
declarant denies having made the statement or has
forgotten . . . .66

Wyoming applies the congressional limitation only in criminal cases.67
III. PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
This part considers whether the current treatment of prior consistent
statements in the hearsay rule needs to be revisited. As we will see, any
attempt to change the existing Rule would run into some very recent
history.
A. A Short History of Rule 801(d)(1)(B),
Ending with the 2014 Amendment
The original Advisory Committee’s proposed rule creating a hearsay
exemption for certain prior consistent statements turned out to be far less
controversial in Congress than the Committee’s proposal to admit all prior
inconsistent statements. Part of the reason for the different treatment is that
the substantive use of prior consistent statements is simply less important.
Treating inconsistent statements as substantive evidence can provide
enough for the party with the burden of proof to withstand motions to
dismiss for lack of evidence. In contrast, the difference between
substantive and credibility-based use of prior consistent statements is
evanescent—the witness has already testified, thus providing substantive
evidence; the additional fact that the witness made a prior consistent
statement will usually make little or no substantive difference. So there was
not much to get worked up about when it came to consistent statements. As
Judge Friendly stated: “It is not entirely clear why the Advisory Committee
felt it necessary to provide for admissibility of certain prior consistent
statements as affirmative evidence” because the difference between
substantive and rehabilitative use is ephemeral.68
But the Advisory Committee did carve out certain consistent statements
for substantive use. The Committee Note explaining the provision is terse:
“The prior statement is consistent with the testimony given on the stand,
and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in
evidence [by attacking the credibility of the witness-declarant], no sound
reason is apparent why it should not be received generally.”69
The problem with the original Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was that it provided for
substantive admissibility of only some, and not all, consistent statements
that are properly admitted to rehabilitate a witness. The original rule
66.
67.
68.
69.

UTAH R. EVID. 801(d).
WYO. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 70 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring).
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note.
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provided for substantive admissibility only when the witness was attacked
for having a bad motive or for recent fabrication—and then only when the
statement predated the existence of the motive or the interest to fabricate.70
Other consistent statements can rehabilitate, and the same justification for
substantive admissibility can be made: the party has opened the door by
attacking the witness, and the consistent statement rebuts the attack. The
Advisory Committee Note to the 2014 amendment explains the problem of
the too-narrow focus of the original rule, as well as the solution that the
current Advisory Committee provided. The Committee Note explains as
follows:
Though the original Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provided for substantive use of
certain prior consistent statements, the scope of that Rule was limited.
The Rule covered only those consistent statements that were offered to
rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper motive or influence. The
Rule did not, for example, provide for substantive admissibility of
consistent statements that are probative to explain what otherwise appears
to be an inconsistency in the witness’s testimony. Nor did it cover
consistent statements that would be probative to rebut a charge of faulty
memory. Thus, the Rule left many prior consistent statements potentially
admissible only for the limited purpose of rehabilitating a witness’s
credibility. The original Rule also led to some conflict in the cases; some
courts distinguished between substantive and rehabilitative use for prior
consistent statements, while others appeared to hold that prior consistent
statements must be admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or not at all.
...
The intent of the amendment is to extend substantive effect to
consistent statements that rebut other attacks on a witness—such as the
charges of inconsistency or faulty memory.71

The Advisory Committee Note makes a point of emphasizing the limited
scope of the amendment. It does not provide for admission of more prior
consistent statements. It simply makes all prior consistent statements that
are traditionally admissible for rehabilitation purposes also admissible for
the truth of the matter asserted.
The amendment does not change the traditional and well-accepted limits
on bringing prior consistent statements before the fact finder for credibility
purposes. It does not allow impermissible bolstering of a witness. As
before, prior consistent statements under the amendment may be brought
before the fact finder only if they properly rehabilitate a witness whose
credibility has been attacked. As before, to be admissible for rehabilitation,
a prior consistent statement must also satisfy the strictures of Rule 403. As
before, the trial court has ample discretion to exclude prior consistent
statements that are cumulative accounts of an event. The amendment does
not make any consistent statement admissible that was not admissible

70. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995).
71. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment.
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previously—the only difference is that prior consistent statements otherwise
admissible for rehabilitation are now admissible substantively as well.
So, Rule 801(d)(1)(B), as amended in 2014, provides as follows:
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the
following conditions is not hearsay:
(1) A Declarant-Witness’[s] Prior Statement. The declarant testifies
and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and
the statement:
...
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered:
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge that the
declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a
recent improper influence or motive in so testifying;
or
(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a
witness when attacked on another ground . . . .72

The intended effect of the amendment is to do away with the need to
provide an unhelpful limiting instruction for all prior consistent statements
that are admissible to rehabilitate the witness’s credibility. No longer need
an instruction—for example, that “the statement that the witness made can
be used only insofar as it explains his inconsistent statement and not for the
truth of any assertion in the consistent statement”—be given. These
limiting instructions were considered not worth the candle due to their
inherent difficulty and the lack of a practical distinction between
substantive and credibility use of prior consistent statements.
The recency of the amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) necessarily has an
effect on what the Advisory Committee should do with respect to
admissibility of prior consistent statements. Certainly any limiting of the
scope of substantive admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) should not be
undertaken in light of a so-recent expansion. But it would seem at least
possible to consider further expanding the admissibility of prior consistent
statements in ways that are different from the path chosen by the Advisory
Committee in the 2014 amendment.
One possibility would be to untether substantive admissibility from
admissibility to rehabilitate. That would be the upshot of an amendment
that would treat all prior witness statements as exempt from the hearsay
rule. But tying admissibility of prior consistent statements to rehabilitation
of credibility has the virtue of avoiding the problem of parties trying to
manufacture consistent statements for trial. (That would be “impermissible
bolstering” in lawyer-speak.) And the current tie to rehabilitation has the
further virtue of being grounded in the policy of “opening the door”—
admissibility is dependent on an attack on the witness’s credibility. If
substantive admissibility were untethered from rehabilitation, then the
opponent would lose the control over admissibility that the original
Advisory Committee found to be important. For these reasons and others
72. Id. 801(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
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articulately raised by Professor Liesa Richter at the symposium, prior
consistent statements are better left where they are—the 2014 amendment
has done good work, and there is no sufficient reason to provide for greater
admissibility of prior consistent statements.
IV. PRIOR STATEMENTS OF IDENTIFICATION
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 801(d)(1)(C) explains the reason
for carving out an exception for prior statements of identification: the prior
identification is more reliable than the in-court identification because it was
made “at an earlier time under less suggestive conditions.”73 This
explanation is further supported by the fact that the identifying witness must
be subject to cross-examination and that cross-examination in this particular
circumstance can be quite useful because the witness can be asked not only
about the process of identification, but also about the basis that the witness
had for making the identification in the first place (how far away he was
from the robbery, whether he was wearing his glasses, etc.).
Interestingly, the Senate initially rejected the proposed Rule
801(d)(1)(C); the House acquiesced to that rejection in order to ensure
passage of the Rules of Evidence.74 The Senate had deleted the provision
because of strenuous objection by Senator Sam Ervin. He was concerned
that a conviction could be based solely on an unsworn hearsay statement in
which the declarant identified the defendant.75
But Congress then amended Rule 801(d)(1) in 1975 to add back the
Advisory Committee’s proposal.76 The report from the Senate Judiciary
Committee found that Senator Ervin’s concerns were “misdirected.”77 The
report makes four points: 1) the rule is addressed to admissibility, not
sufficiency; 2) most of the hearsay exceptions allow statements into
evidence that were not made under oath; 3) the declarant is testifying
subject to cross-examination, assuring that “if any discrepancy occurs
between the witness’[s] in-court and out-of-court testimony, the opportunity
is available to probe, with the witness under oath, the reasons for that
discrepancy so that the trier of fact might determine which statement is to
be believed”; and 4) the identification must pass constitutional muster under
the Supreme Court cases regulating identifications, et cetera, thus
guaranteeing some reliability.78
In practice, Rule 801(d)(1)(C) has proved relatively uncontroversial.
Perhaps the most contested point was resolved by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Owens,79 which allowed admission of a prior identification
73. Id. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note.
74. CONG. REC. 9653 (Oct. 6, 1975) (statement of Rep. Hungate).
75. CONG. REC. 9654 (Oct. 6, 1975) (statement of Rep. Wiggins).
76. Pub. L. No. 94-113, 89 Stat. 576 (1975).
77. S. REP. NO. 94-199, at 2 (1975).
78. Id. For treatment of the Supreme Court cases on the process of eyewitness
identification, see Chapter 4 of STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG AND DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY (10th ed. 2014).
79. 484 U.S. 554 (1988).

1446

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

even though the witness had no memory about the reasons for making that
identification. The witness without memory was found “subject to crossexamination” within the meaning of the Rule.80 There appears to be no
groundswell for reconsidering Owens by way of amendment to the
Evidence Rules. Nor should there be, as a faulty memory can well be the
target for effective cross-examination, and it would be difficult if not
impossible to craft a rule that would set forth criteria for when an attack on
faulty memory will or will not be productive in an individual case.
Insofar as prior statements of identification are concerned, the only
possibility of amendment that would appear to be on the table would be the
broad approach, discussed above, of making all prior statements of
testifying witnesses substantively admissible. Short of that, it would appear
that the existing Rule 801(d)(1)(C) is working well and should be retained.
V. DRAFTING ALTERNATIVES
There are essentially three ways to expand the substantive admissibility
of prior statements of witnesses (assuming, of course, that the Advisory
Committee agrees that some kind of expansion of admissibility is justified).
The first is the broad approach that would lift the hearsay ban from all prior
statements of witnesses—which, as noted above, may be too extreme a
remedy, as it would expand admission of prior consistent statements, a
move that does not seem supportable at this time. The second is to lift the
congressional bar on substantive use of most prior inconsistent statements,
set forth in Rule 801(d)(1)(A)—this is a more targeted attack, directed to
the misguided limitations imposed by Congress on the substantive
admissibility of prior inconsistent statements. And the third is to narrow the
ban in Rule 801(d)(1)(A) to situations in which there is some guarantee
provided (short of oath at a formal proceeding) that the inconsistent
statement was actually made. This part provides drafting alternatives for
each of these approaches.81
A. Lifting the Hearsay Ban on Prior Statements of Witnesses
There appear to be two possible ways to lift the hearsay ban on prior
statements of witnesses. The first is to change the hearsay definition; the
second is to provide an exception.
1. Changing the Hearsay Definition
Changing the hearsay definition might be tricky, but something like this
may work:
Rule 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from
Hearsay.

80. Id. at 561.
81. Additions to the current Rule are denoted in bold typeface; deletions are stricken out.
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(a) Statement. “Statement” means a person’s oral assertion, written
assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an
assertion.
(b) Declarant. “Declarant” means the person who made the
statement.
(c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” means a statement that:
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying—unless
subject to cross-examination about it—at the current
trial or hearing; and
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement.
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the
following conditions is not hearsay:
(1) [Now covered in Rule 801(c)(1)] A Declarant-Witness’s
Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is subject to
cross-examination about a prior statement, and the
statement:
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and
was given under penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition;
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is
offered:
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge
that the declarant recently fabricated it
or acted from a recent improper
influence or motive in so testifying; or
(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility
as a witness when attacked on another
ground; or
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant
perceived earlier.
(2) An Opposing Party’s Statement. The statement is offered
against an opposing party and:
(A) was made by the party in an individual or
representative capacity;
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or
believed to be true;
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized
to make a statement on the subject;
(D) was made by the party’s agent or employee on a
matter within the scope of that relationship and
while it existed; or
(E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and
in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The statement must be considered but does not by itself
establish the declarant’s authority under (C); the existence
or scope of the relationship under (D); or the existence of
the conspiracy or participation in it under (E).

Reporter’s Observations:
(1) If you agree with Morgan’s arguments, then taking prior witness
statements out of the definition of hearsay is analytically correct. It
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is not hearsay because the solution to hearsay is cross-examination
and the declarant here is subject to cross-examination (albeit
delayed) about their own statement. On the other hand, a prior
statement of a testifying witness, when offered for its truth, does fit
the classic definition of hearsay: it is a statement made out of court
that is offered for its truth. Further, the fix of adding the language
in the middle of the hearsay rule seems awkward; it is like dropping
a rock into an otherwise quiet pool. So perhaps it is better to think
about a hearsay exception for prior witness statements, as the
jurisdictions that admit all prior witness statements substantively
have done—for example, the Kansas and Puerto Rico exceptions.82
(2) The other problem with changing the definition and not making an
exception is that the change would create a gaping hole where Rule
801(d)(1) used to be. This is not fatal, but it does look a bit odd.
And it poses a challenge for electronic searches of case law
involving prior witness statements—the case law essentially shifts
midstream from Rule 801(d)(1) to Rule 801(c).
(3) If Rule 801(d)(1) is abrogated, this does not mean that Rule
801(d)(2) should be moved up. That would create even more havoc
for electronic searches and settled expectations. The protocol for
evidence rulemaking is that if a rule is abrogated or moved, the
former number is left open, with an instruction as to where the rule
went. For instance, see the gap between Rule 804(b)(4) and
804(b)(6), which was caused when Rule 804(b)(5) was moved to
Rule 807 as part of a combined residual exception.83
2. A Hearsay Exception for All Prior Witness Statements
A hearsay exception for prior witness statements is probably best placed
in Rule 801(d) itself; that is certainly the least disruptive fix:
Rule 801.
Hearsay.

Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from

(a) Statement. “Statement” means a person’s oral assertion, written
assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an
assertion.
(b) Declarant. “Declarant” means the person who made the
statement.
(c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” means a statement that:
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current
trial or hearing; and
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement.
82. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
83. The instruction now seen under Rule 804(b)(5) states: “Transferred to Rule 807.”
That language will not work if prior statements of witnesses are now placed outside hearsay
proscription by a change to Rule 801(c). That is because Rule 801(d)(1) would not be
“transferred” lock, stock, and barrel in the way that Rule 804(b)(5) was. That is why the
bracketed material reads, “Now covered in Rule 801(c)(1).”

2016]

PRIOR STATEMENTS OF TESTIFYING WITNESSES

1449

(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the
following conditions is not hearsay:
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a the
prior statement, provided the statement would be
admissible if made by the declarant while testifying as
a witness., and the statement:
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and
was given under penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition;
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is
offered:
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge
that the declarant recently fabricated it
or acted from a recent improper
influence or motive in so testifying; or
(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility
as a witness when attacked on another
ground; or
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant
perceived earlier.
(2) An Opposing Party’s Statement. The statement is offered
against an opposing party and:
(A) was made by the party in an individual or
representative capacity;
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or
believed to be true;
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized
to make a statement on the subject;
(D) was made by the party’s agent or employee on a
matter within the scope of that relationship and
while it existed; or
(E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and
in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The statement must be considered but does not by itself
establish the declarant’s authority under (C); the existence
or scope of the relationship under (D); or the existence of
the conspiracy or participation in it under (E).

Reporter’s Observations:
(1) It is possible that the proviso—that the statement would be
admissible if the declarant were to make the same statement at
trial—is surplusage. If the declarant would not be allowed to make
the statement while testifying—for example, if the declarant lacked
personal knowledge, or it was unduly prejudicial, or privileged—
then it should be excluded for independent reasons. The other
sources of exclusion are fully applicable to hearsay admitted under
an exception. But in order to avoid unanticipated problems, the
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language cannot hurt. Similar language is used in both the Kansas
and Puerto Rico rules.84
(2) Some might object that amending Rule 801(d)(1) would be
unsatisfactory because it would continue the pernicious category of
“not hearsay” hearsay. Rule 801(d)(1) categorizes prior witness
statements, confoundingly, as “not hearsay” even though they
clearly fit the definition of hearsay in Rule 801(c). In reality, Rule
801(d)(1) provides an exemption from the hearsay rule for these
statements. If you are going to make it an exception, it is
conceptually better to call it an exception to the hearsay rule rather
than to call something “not hearsay” when it actually fits the
In 2010, the Advisory Committee
definition of hearsay.85
considered a proposal from a law professor to move the Rule
801(d) “not hearsay” categories into real hearsay exceptions.86 The
Advisory Committee rejected the proposal on several grounds: 1)
lawyers and courts have become familiar with “not hearsay”
hearsay; 2) the question is one of nomenclature only, as there is no
practical difference between hearsay admissible for its truth as “not
hearsay” and hearsay admissible for its truth as “hearsay subject to
an exception”; 3) moving the categories out of Rule 801(d) would
impose costs of upsetting electronic searches and settled
expectations with no corresponding practical benefit. For all these
reasons, any broadened hearsay exception for prior statements of
witnesses should be placed in Rule 801(d)(1), as it is the least
intrusive alternative and there is no good reason (other than a
theoretical one) to change the category from “not hearsay” to a
hearsay exception.87
B. Lifting the Congressional Limitation on Substantive Admissibility
of Prior Inconsistent Statements
That would be easy rulemaking:
Rule 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from
Hearsay.
...
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the
following conditions is not hearsay:
84. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
85. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Restyling Choices and a Mistake, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1517, 1523 (2012) (referring to the categories of statements covered by Rules 801(d)(1)
and (2) as “nonhearsay hearsay”).
86. See Sam Stonefield, Rule 801(d)’s Oxymoronic “Not Hearsay” Classification: The
Untold Backstory and a Suggested Amendment, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011).
87. See Daniel J. Capra, Appendix B: The Restyled Rules of Federal Evidence, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1528 (2011) for the Reporter’s memo on the proposed redesignation and
realignment of prior witness statements. The Advisory Committee’s rejection of the
proposal is found in the minutes of the Advisory Committee meeting of October 12, 2010,
on file with the author and available at www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-andarchives-rules-committees/meeting-minutes.
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(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior
statement, and the statement:
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and
was given under penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition;
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is
offered:
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge
that the declarant recently fabricated it
or acted from a recent improper
influence or motive in so testifying; or
(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility
as a witness when attacked on another
ground; or
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant
perceived earlier.
*

*

*

C. Narrowing the Limitation on Prior Inconsistent Statements
to Address Concerns About Whether the Statement Was Ever Made
This drafting alternative borrows from the states that already have such a
provision.
Rule 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from
Hearsay.
...
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the
following conditions is not hearsay:
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant
testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior
statement, and the statement:
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and
the declarant acknowledges under oath the
making of the statement, or the statement was:
(i) given under penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding or in a
deposition;
(ii) written, adopted, or prepared
electronically by the declarant; or
(iii) a
verbatim
contemporaneous
stenographic or electronic recording
of the declarant’s oral statement; or
(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is
offered:
(i) to rebut an express or implied charge
that the declarant recently fabricated it
or acted from a recent improper
influence or motive in so testifying; or
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(ii) to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility
as a witness when attacked on another
ground; or
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant
perceived earlier.

Reporter’s Observations:
(1) It would be possible to craft language that would delete the
congressional limitation and yet address its concerns by describing
all the conditions in which there would be sufficient assurance that
the statement was made. But the congressional language has been
in place for forty years and there is case law on it. The better
approach seems to be to retain the language as one means of
satisfying the concern over whether a statement was made and then
to provide additional grounds that justify a conclusion that the
statement was made. That process is similar to the one chosen in
the 2014 amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B): the original language
was retained and new grounds for admissibility were added.
(2) The draft adds a provision that the statement is substantively
admissible if the witness concedes at trial that he made the
statement. That should surely be enough to allay any concern that
the statement was never made. Under current law, even if the
witness admits making the statement, it is not substantively
admissible unless it was made under oath at a formal proceeding.
This example shows that the congressional limitation is overkill in
addressing the concern that a prior inconsistent statement was never
made.
(3) The draft specifically addresses Professor Saltzburg’s point, made
at the symposium, that prior inconsistent statements are difficult to
cross-examine when the witness denies making them. Under the
draft, if the witness denies making the statement, it is not be
substantively admissible unless there is proof that the declarant in
fact made the statement.
Under that circumstance, crossexamination can address why the witness is lying about not making
the prior statement—a topic that may well be productive for the
cross-examiner even if the witness adheres to his story. After all,
the opportunity to cross-examine does not have to be perfect to
satisfy the concerns of the hearsay rule; it just has to be adequate.88
Moreover, it is simply bad policy to allow a witness to veto the
substantive admissibility of his prior inconsistent statement, simply
by denying having made it when the evidence indicates to the
contrary.
CONCLUSION
Theoretically, the rationales behind the hearsay rule—a concern over the
inability to cross-examine the hearsay declarant and a preference for live
88. See generally United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
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testimony—have no applicability to prior statements of testifying witnesses.
It should follow that Federal Rule 801(c) should be amended so that prior
witness statements would not be covered by the definition of hearsay.89 Yet
that route is not chosen even by the systems that exempt prior witness
statements from the coverage of the hearsay rule; and under the Federal
Rules, such a change would result in an unnecessary disruption, given forty
years of practice in which prior witness statements have been evaluated as
hearsay, subject to an exemption for certain such statements. Expansion of
admissibility of prior witness statements is thus best accomplished by
expanding the current hearsay exemption provided by Rule 801(d)(1).
The question, then, is the scope of the expansion. While theoretically the
hearsay rule should not apply at all to prior witness statements, functionally
there is a fair reason for maintaining the current limits on prior consistent
statements.
The current rule—which ties hearsay proscription to
rehabilitation—operates to limit strategic creation of prior consistent
statements. And while that goal is conceptually not a match with the
hearsay rule, it is consistent with the Advisory Committee’s original
conception for providing substantive admissibility of consistent statements.
So any expansion should probably be focused on greater admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements.
There is much to be said for allowing substantive admissibility of all
prior inconsistent statements, as many of the states have done. But the
concern over whether the statement was ever made, while not a hearsay
concern, is one that has been invoked by lawyers and commentators for
many years and is difficult to ignore. The congressional limitation on
substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements is, however, a
patently overbroad and draconian solution to that concern. Narrower
protections employed by a number of states—allowing for substantive
admissibility of prior inconsistent statements if admitted by the witness or if
recorded—appropriately allow for greater substantive admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements, while effectively addressing concerns about
whether the statement was ever made.

89. Technically, such statements are called “not hearsay” under Rule 801(d)(1), but as
discussed above, this designation operates as a hearsay exemption or exception—nonhearsay
hearsay—because prior witness statements definitely fit within the definition of hearsay
under Rule 801(c).

